Saturday, July 25, 2009

The Perils of Litigating Pro Se (without a lawyer)


Time and again litigants come to grief trying to represent themselves without competent licensed attorney. They have the right to do so under the rules, but self-represented parties are rarely successful, for numerous reasons. In one recent case, a pro se grandparent brought a suit regarding a grandchild that he not only lost, but for which he was punished by having to pay the other party's attorney's fees as a sanction. A warning worth heeding.


FROM THE APPELLATE OPINION:


It appears that Watts' real complaint is that the trial court erred by imposing the attorney's fees as a sanction pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 13 for his frivolous filing of a lawsuit in which he clearly had no standing, in a county where the child had not lived for four years, seeking a form of relief to which he was not entitled.

The trial court heard the parties on this matter. Rule 13 allows imposition of the penalties set out in Rule 215.2(b) on concluding that a pleading or lawsuit is groundless and brought in bad faith, or groundless and brought for the purpose of harassment, or as an experiment. Tex. R. Civ. P. 13. "Groundless" is defined by the rule as having "no basis in law or fact and not warranted by good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law."

There is no conceivable way in which the genetic testing statute could be utilized by this party for this purpose. The trial court found in its judgment that the action was violative of Rule 13 and that the lawsuit was frivolous because Watts had no standing, and then ordered Watts to pay the appellees' attorney's fees.

Sanctions for filing frivolous pleadings are available under Chapter 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code or under Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. v. Lazy Nine Mun. Util. Dist. ex rel. Board of Directors, 198 S.W.3d 300, 319 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2006, pet. filed). We review a trial court's Rule 13 sanction for abuse of discretion. Am. Flood Research, Inc. v. Jones, 192 S.W.3d 581 (Tex. 2006). Although a trial court's failure to specify the good cause for sanctions in a sanction order may be an abuse of discretion, Gaspard v. Beadle, 36 S.W.3d 229, 239 (Tex. App.--Houston
[1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied), in this case, the reason was apparent from the order.

We also recognize that sanctions should not be used as "a weapon . . . to punish those with whose intellect or philosophic viewpoint the trial court finds fault." Save Our Springs Alliance, 198 S.W.3d at 319; Tarrant County v. Chancey, 942 S.W.2d 151, 154-55 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1997, no writ).

A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts "without reference to any guiding rules and principles," such that its ruling is arbitrary or unreasonable. Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 839 (Tex. 2004). When determining if the trial court abused its discretion, we must ensure that the sanctions were appropriate or just. Id. The Texas Supreme Court has articulated a two-part inquiry that we should conduct in making this determination. Id. First, we must ensure the punishment was imposed on the true offender and tailored to remedy any prejudice caused. Id. Second, we must make certain that less severe sanctions would not have been sufficient. Id.

The punishment was imposed on Watts, who intentionally pursued a patently unavailable cause of action for reasons not supportable under the statute. Thus, the true offender was punished. See Onstad v. Wright, 54 S.W.3d 799, 809 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2001, pet. denied). The prejudice caused was that of having to incur attorney's fees to defend against the frivolous lawsuit. The sanction was tailored to remedy the harm. Watts argues that less severe sanctions would have been sufficient. He does not suggest what those might be, and we find it appropriate to require an individual who files a frivolous lawsuit against a party to pay that party's attorney's fees. The sanction was not as severe as it could have been, and we find no abuse of discretion in imposing this sanction in this particular situation. The contention of error is
overruled.

For the reasons stated above, we find that the trial court correctly dismissed the lawsuit and that the attorney's fees imposed as sanctions are supportable.

In re L.K.W.G., No. 06-06-00073-CV (Tex.App.- Texarkana, Feb. 2, 2007) (pro se grandparent suit for visitation and motion for genetic testing found baseless and frivolous; sanctions imposed)

STANDING: Grandparent must have standing to bring suit for access to grandchild under Texas Family Code


Standing refers to the legal right to bring an action in court. In the case of grandparents, the requirements for standing to file a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, or to intervene in a pending suit involving child custody or visitation, are defined by statute, specifically the Texas Family Court.


Texas courts of appeals have addressed standing in grandparents rights cases as follows:

Standing is implicit in the concept of subject matter jurisdiction. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). A party's lack of standing deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, and renders any trial court action void. Taub v. Aquila Sw. Pipeline Corp., 93 S.W.3d 451, 455 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Whether a party has standing is a threshold issue, and one which we review de novo. See In re SSJ-J, 153 S.W.3d 132, 134 (Tex. App.- San Antonio 2004, no pet.); Hobbs v. Van Stavern, 249 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). When standing has been conferred by statute, the statute itself should serve as the proper framework for a standing analysis. In re Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d 911, 915 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).
* * *
The Family Code provides that a biological or adoptive grandparent may request access to a grandchild. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. ' 153.432. As the child's biological grandmother, Lisa meets this standing requirement. The Smiths contend, however, that section 153.433 imposes additional conditions for standing. The plain statutory language does not support this interpretation. Sections 153.432 and 153.434[4] expressly speak in terms of when a grandparent "may request" or "may not request" access or possession, and therefore address the right to file an access suit. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. '' 153.432, 153.434. By contrast, section 153.433 outlines when "[t]he court shall order" possession or access. See id. ' 153.433.
Not surprisingly, Texas courts consistently have held that a grandparent's standing to request access is conferred by section 153.432, not 153.433: "Section 153.432 of the family code does give grandparents standing to petition the court for access to or possession of a child. Section 153.433 identifies the conditions under which such possession or access will be granted." In re H.M.J.H., 209 S.W.3d 320, 322 (Tex. App.- Dallas 2006, no pet).[5] Although a successful access suit might require the grandparent to satisfy section 153.433, whether the grandparent ultimately will succeed is a different question than whether the grandparent has the right simply to bring suit. See generally In re C.M.C., 192 S.W.3d 866, 869-70 (Tex. App.- Texarkana 2006, no pet.) ("[A] decision concerning whether a party has standing is not a decision deciding the merits of a case."); In re SSJ-J, 153 S.W.3d at 138 ("[S]tanding does not mean the right to win; it is only a right to be heard.").

In re Kevin J. Smith, No. 14-08-00164-CV , ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] July 3, 2008)(Frost) (SAPCR, grandparent access mandamus denied, standing requirement for access satisfied)


Standing is a threshold issue and must be decided before the merits of the case. In re K.I.A., 205 S.W.3d 14 (Tex. App.--Eastland 2006, no pet.); In re Pringle, 862 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1993, no pet.).

When standing has been statutorily conferred, the statute itself serves as the proper framework for a standing analysis. Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Inman, 121 S.W.3d 862, 869 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.); Everett v. TK-Taito, L.L.C., 178 S.W.3d 844, 851 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2005, no pet.); see Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 178 (Tex. 2001). Standing to pursue the action, in this context, is provided by statute. Watts is not a party given standing to pursue the action. Thus, the trial court correctly dismissed his suit on that basis.
In re L.K.W.G., No. 06-06-00073-CV (Tex.App.- Texarkana, Feb. 2, 2007) (pro se grandparent suit motion for visitation had no standing, basis to bring lawsuit and file motions; frivolous suit finding, sanctions imposed)


[S]ection 102.004(b) [of the Texas Family Code] explicitly sets forth who may intervene in a suit seeking to establish managing conservatorship. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 102.004(b) (Vernon Supp. 2007). Gary and Cindy B. did not meet that criteria. In a similar context involving a step-grandparent, the Texas Supreme Court rejected a standing argument based on an asserted justiciable interest, holding, "We cannot conclude that [the step-grandparent] has a justiciable interest in the controversy sufficient to override the statutory text" that explicitly sets forth who may sue for access. In re Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d 327, 332-33 (Tex. 2007). Similarly, in this case, we cannot conclude that Gary and Cindy B. have a justiciable interest in the controversy sufficient to override the statutory text requiring them to have substantial past contact in order to intervene as an "other person." See id. In re S.L.M., No. 04-07-00566-CV (Tex.App.- San Antonio June 18, 2008) nonparent standing, sibling visitation)


AUSTIN: Grandparent Custody & Visitation Appeals


Austin Court of Appeals

Cases involving grandparents' lawsuit or intervention seeking possessory or managing conservatorship of, or access to, grand child/grand children.

Baggs v. Becker
, No. 03-07-00731-CV (Tex.App.- Austin, Feb. 6, 2009, pet. denied June 2009)(grandparent sought custody after parents' divorce, Texas court declines to exercise jurisdiction in favor of Florida on forum non conveniens grounds)
("This appeal arises from a child custody suit filed by the child's grandmother and her husband. The trial court found that the State of Texas was an inconvenient forum and declined jurisdiction in favor of Florida. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.207 (West 2002). The grandparents appeal and contend that the trial court's decision to decline jurisdiction was an abuse of discretion because it was not supported by the evidence. The Austin Court of Appeals hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirms the decision of the trial court.")

Kenda Kushner v. Stan Kushner, No. 03-06-00634-CV (Tex.App.- Austin, Mar. 7, 2008) (Opinion by Justice Pemberton )(Mother's appeal of order awarding custody of child to paternal grandfather intervening under the grandparent provisions of the Texas Family Code fails. Trial court did not err in refusing to strike petition in intervention.)
("Kenda Kushner appeals the district court's judgment appointing her ex-husband's father, Stanley Kushner, as sole managing conservator of her and her ex-husband's son, M.J.K. In a single issue, Kenda (1) argues that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to strike Stanley's Petition in Intervention of Grandparent in Suit Affecting the Child-Parent Relationship because Stanley failed to allege sufficient facts to satisfy the requirements to intervene under section 102.004(b) of the Texas Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §102.004(b) (West Supp. 2007). We overrule Kenda's issue and affirm the judgment of the district court. * * *
We affirm the district court's judgment appointing Stanley Kushner as sole managing conservator, and Phillip and Kenda Kushner as possessory conservators, of the child M.J.K.")

Spencer v. Vaughn, No. 03-05-00077-CV (Tex.App.- Austin, March 6, 2008)(order granting grandparent access affirmed)
("Appellants [...] appeal from the trial court's orders, entered after a jury trial, granting appellees Noel Douglas Vaughn and Catherine Gay Vaughn, Kippling Spencer's parents, access to their grandchildren M.N.Y. and S.N.S. They argue that the grandparent visitation statute then in effect is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to them. They further argue that it was an abuse of discretion to modify M.N.Y.'s conservatorship and to award $100,000 in attorney's fees. We affirm the trial court's orders.")


WACO appeals from grandparent child custody and termination of parental rights litigation


Waco Court of Appeals

In re K. A.J. , No. 10-07-00110-CV (Tex.App.- Waco, June 13, 2007) (grandparent attempted to appeal
termination of parents' termination of parental rights, standing issue, notice of appeal untimely)

TEXARKANA CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITION - GRANDPARENT APPEALS


Texarkana Court of Appeals

In re M.A.H., No. 06-06-00081-CV, 224 SW3d 838 (Tex.App.- Texarkana, May 16, 2007)
(appeal from order granting custody to grandmother)

In re L.K.W.G., No. 06-06-00073-CV (Tex.App.- Texarkana, Feb. 2, 2007)
(pro se grandparent suit motion for visitation, motion for genetic testing, frivolous suit finding, sanctions imposed)


CORPUS CHRISTI: Grandparent custody, visitation and access caselaw


Corpus Christi Court of Appeals

Banta v. Texas DFPS, No. 13-06-00548-CV (Tex.App.- Corpus Christi, July 26, 2007)(grandparent access
denied)

Casas v. Adriano, No. 13-06-00373-CV (Tex.App.- Corpus Christi, July 5, 2007)(grandparent access granted
and order affirmed on appeal)


SAN ANTONIO Appeals involving Grandparents


San Antonio Court of Appeals

Decisions in civil cases involving grandparents as parties and other cases involving grandparents, grandchildren, and nonparents seeking access, visitation, or custody of child

In re S.L.M.
, No. 04-07-00566-CV (Tex.App.- San Antonio June 18, 2008) (nonparent standing, sibling visitation)
("[S]ection 102.004(b) [of the Texas Family Code] explicitly sets forth who may intervene in a suit seeking to establish managing conservatorship. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 102.004(b) (Vernon Supp. 2007). Gary and Cindy B. did not meet that criteria. In a similar context involving a step-grandparent, the Texas Supreme Court rejected a standing argument based on an asserted justiciable interest, holding, "We cannot conclude that [the step-grandparent] has a justiciable interest in the controversy sufficient to override the statutory text" that explicitly sets forth who may sue for access. In re Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d 327, 332-33 (Tex. 2007). Similarly, in this case, we cannot conclude that Gary and Cindy B. have a justiciable interest in the controversy sufficient to override the statutory text requiring them to have substantial past contact in order to intervene as an "other person." See id.") ...
("Although section 153.551 establishes a statutory right to seek sibling access, section 102.0045 requires the sibling requesting access to be at least 18 years of age. (2) Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.551, 102.0045 (Vernon Supp. 2007). Since S.B. is not at least eighteen years of age, she does not have standing to seek sibling access. Id.; but see generally Paige Ingram CastaƱeda, Comment, O Brother (or Sister), Where Art Thou: Sibling Standing in Texas, 55 Baylor L. Rev. (2003) (arguing legislature should extend standing to both adult and minor siblings and allow them to petition court for sibling access or visitation).")

In re J.O. No. 04-07-00752-CV (Tex.App.- San Antonio, May 14, 2008, no pet.)(grandmother as temporary possessory conservator, parental presumption)

in re Ray Ellison Grandchildren Trust, No. 04-06-00704-CV (Tex.App.- San Antonio, April 2, 2008, pet. filed) (probate law, construction of the word descendants, adoption of adult vs. child, legislative history of adoption statue)

In re M.A.S., No. 04-06-00626-CV, (Tex.App.- San Antonio September 12, 2007)
("Speer contends that the trial court erred in applying a presumption that a parent acts in the best interest of her children in the modification proceeding. Citing In re V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d 338 (Tex. 2000) (1), Speer argues that the presumption, which is set forth in section 153.433(2) of the Texas Family Code (2), applies only to an original custody proceeding but not to a modification proceeding. We agree.")

In re deFilippi, No. 04-07-00506-CV, 235 S.W.3d 319 (Tex.App.- San Antonio, August 30, 2007)(children ordered returned to father after mother's death, superior custodial rights compared to grandparents)
In this original proceeding, relator Christopher R. deFilippi seeks a writ of mandamus to obtain possession of his three children after the unexpected death of their mother. The Honorable Oscar J. Hale, Jr., Judge of the 406th Judicial District Court of Webb County, denied relator's habeas corpus petition. We conclude that the trial judge had a ministerial duty to return the children to their father and therefore conditionally grant mandamus relief.

In re H.G. No.
04-07-00656-CV, ___ SW3d ___ (Tex.App.- San Antonio, June 11 ,2008)(grandparents of adopted children lack standing, attempted intervention in adoptive parents' divorce, quasi-estoppel)

In re Sanchez, No. 04-06-00809-CV, 228 S.W.3d 214 (Tex.App.- San Antonio, April 4, 2007) ("Jennifer Sanchez seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to vacate temporary orders in a child custody modification suit. Because the trial court failed to apply the law properly and Sanchez has no remedy by appeal, we conditionally grant the relief requested.")

Tristan v. Castillo, No.
04-05-00658-CV (Tex.App.- San Antonio, March 14, 2007)


HOUSTON: Grandparent-Parent Disputes - Appellate Caselaw


Houston Courts of Appeals

In re Kevin J. Smith, No. 14-08-00164-CV , ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] July 3, 2008)(Frost) (SAPCR, grandparent access mandamus denied, standing requirement for access satisfied)

Taylor v. Taylor, No. 01-07-00571-CV, 254 S.W.3d 527 (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] March 20, 2008)
(grandparent vs. parent SAPCR jury trial, judgment on jury verdict reversed, sanctions)

In re Collins, No. 14-07-00624-CV, 242 S.W.3d 837 (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Dec 17, 2007)(amicus
attorney for deceased child, wrongful death suit, mandamus relief against temporary order)

In Interest of C.A.M.M., No. 14-06-00279-CV, 243 S.W.3d 211 (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist] October 30, 2007) (Guzman) (SAPCR, nonparent custody, grandparent must overcome presumption that parents act in best interest of child) Concurring Opinion by Justice Frost

Heiskell v. Kendrick (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] October 26, 2007)(Hedges)(SAPCR, grandparents)

Bolton v. Schultz, 14-05-00410-CV, 14-06-00102-CV (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] July 17,
2007)(Anderson)(SAPCR, intervention, adoption dispute)

Whitworth v. Whitworth, No. 01-04-01026-CV, 222 S.W.3d 616 (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] March 16, 2007, no pet.)(Hanks) (subst. opinion on rehearing)(family law, SAPCR, SMC, grandparents, standing to intervene) ("Based on our review of the evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in appointing Carol as the sole managing conservator after finding, by a preponderance of credible evidence, that appointing Tammy as a managing conservator would result in serious physical or emotional harm to K.C. See Brook, 881 S.W.2d at 298. We also hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Tammy less than standard possession.")

Monroe v. Alternatives in Motion, No. 01-05-01188-CV, 234 S.W.3d 56 (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 22, 2007)(termination of parental rights affirmed, jury demand was not timely made)

In re Schoelpple, No. 14-06-01038-CV (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] February 13, 2007)(per curiam denial) (family law & litigation, SAPCR, grandparent access, effect of nonsuit on intervention)


FORT WORTH: Grandparents Vistitation & Access Caselaw


Fort Worth Court of Appeals

In re J.P.C., No. 02-07-00184-CV (Tex.App.- Fort Worth, July 17, 2008)(death of parent, grandparent
intervention unsuccessful, access order reversed by court of appeals)
("We have closely reviewed the record in this case for evidence that denial of access would significantly impair J.P.C.'s physical health or emotional well-being, and we are unpersuaded by the grandparents' arguments. Our review of the record shows that the grandparents have not presented any probative evidence to show that J.P.C.'s physical or emotional health would be significantly impaired by the denial of access. See Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 211. Instead, the grandparents have offered only bare, unsupported allegations that the denial of access would significantly impair J.P.C. * * *
After reviewing the record, we determine that the evidence produced by the grandparents, largely consisting of their own feelings and speculations, did not rise to the level of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that denial of access would significantly impair the physical health or emotional well-being of J.P.C. The mere opinion of the grandparents themselves and an interested, nonexpert witness that the grandparents should be granted access does not overcome the statutory presumption, nor does it support the court's interference with Dayna's parental rights by awarding the grandparents court-ordered access to J.P.C. Thus, the grandparents have failed to show that the denial of access would significantly impair J.P.C.'s physical or emotional well-being. Because a trial court has no discretion in applying the law to the facts, the trial court's determination that the statutory presumption was overcome was an abuse of discretion.")

In re W.M, No. 02-07-00028-CV (Tex.App.- Fort Worth, June 28, 2007)(termination of parental rights,
voluntariness of affidavit of relinquishment, best interest factors)


DALLAS Grandparents Rights Cases


Dallas Court of Appeals

In re M.P.B.
No. 05-07-00093-CV (Tex.App.- Dallas June 20, 2008)(primary JMC for grandmother affirmed)
("M.P.B.'s father appeals the trial court's order appointing M.P.B.'s grandmother as the non- parent primary joint managing conservator and Father as a parent joint managing conservator. In three issues, Father contends (1) Grandmother did not have standing to bring suit, (2) the trial court denied him the right to a jury trial, and (3) Grandmother failed to overcome the statutory presumption that it is in a child's best interest to have custody awarded to a parent. We overrule Father's issues and affirm the trial court's order.")

In re B.N.S., No. 05-07-00016-CV, 247 S.W.3d 807 (Tex.App.- Dallas, March 19, 2008)(access denial on appeal) ("This is an appeal from an order granting Kathy Hartzog and Jerry Grills possession of their three grandchildren pursuant to the grandparent access statute. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.433 (Vernon Supp. 2007). The children's father, James Radford Sayman, challenges the trial court's order, asserting (1) Hartzog and Grills failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for such an order, and (2) the order is unconstitutional because Sayman is a fit parent and there is no evidence he would completely deny access to the children or that the children would suffer emotional harm if the trial court deferred to his decision. Because Hartzog and Grills do not meet the statutory requirements of section 153.433 of the family code, we reverse the trial court's judgment and render judgment that their petition is denied.")

In re J.R.D., No. 05-06-01554-CV (Tex.App.- Dallas, December 19, 2007)(trial court order granting access
reversed by court of appeals; grandparent did not meet burden set by statute to rebut that parental presumption ("This is an appeal from an order granting Ted and Anita Dettmer access and visitation with their paternal grandchild, J.R.D. J.R.D.'s mother challenges the trial court's order contending, among other things, that the trial court erred in not granting her motion for judgment because the Dettmers presented no evidence to meet their statutory burden of proof under section 153.433 of the Texas Family Code. We agree the Dettmers failed to meet their statutory burden. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and render judgment denying the Dettmers' petition for access. Because all dispositive issues are clearly settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion.")

In re D.R.D., No. 05-06-00666-CV (Tex.App. Dallas August 8, 2007) (grandparent access denied, no evidence to support applicable standard, i.e. that denial of access would significantly impair the child's physical health or emotional well-being.)("To prevail on her petition for access, Rushing had to overcome the presumption that Randolph was acting in the best interests of D.R.D. by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that denying Rushing access to D.R.D. would significantly impair the child's physical or emotional health. Id. The record before us contains no evidence from which the trial court could conclude Rushing met her statutory burden. ")

Grandparents Rights Decisions of the Texas Supreme Court


RIGHTS OF GRANDPARENTS AND NONPARENTS IN TEXAS

TEXAS SUPREME COURT CASES
WITH LINKS TO OPINIONS

In Re Chambless, No. 07-0767, 51 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1111 (Tex. Jun. 27, 2008) (per curiam) (orig. proc.) (grandparent visitation improperly granted; mother's due process rights disregarded)(mandamus granted)

In re Moore, No. 06-0544, 235 S.W.3d 210 (Tex. Aug. 31, 2007)(per curiam) (SAPCR, sanctions in child custody dispute between parent and non-parent vacated by mandamus)

In Re Ricky Derzapf, No. 06-0669, 219 S.W.3d 327, 331-32 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (Texas Supreme Court grants mandamus to vindicate natural parent's superior rights)(natural parent preference, presumption)

In re Mays-Hooper, 189 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proc.) (parent prevails over grandparent in dispute over grandparent visitation, parental presumption)(Supreme Court grants mandamus relief)

Kiefer v. Touris (Tex. May 26, 2006)(bill of review suit, paternity, nonpaternity)


TERMINOLOGY: RIGHTS OF GRANDPARENTS, GRANDMOTHER, GRANDFATHER, PATERNAL GRANDMOTERS, MATERNAL GRANDFATHERS, NON-PARENTS, ADOPTIVE PARENTS, DE FACTO PARENTS, NONBIOLOGICAL FATHER FIGURE VS BIOLOGICAL NATURAL PARENT, MOTHER, SIBLING, BROTHERS, SISTERS, UNCLES, AUNTS
CHILD CUSTODY, VISITATION, AND ACCESS, POSSESSORY AND MANAGING CONSERVATOR, PRIMARY CUSTODIAN, MANAGING CONSERVATOR, FULL CUSTODY
GRANDPARENT VISITATION STATUTE
PARENTAL PRESUMPTION, PREFERENCE FOR NATURAL PARENTS, DUE PROCESS, PRESUMPTION OF PATERNITY